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In this paper we focus on the rapidly deepening bilateral India-China economic relationship. 
Each is deeply integrating into the global economy through trade and FDI inflows, China is 
seen as primarily manufacturing-lead growth with India as service-lead growth (see Rodrick 
& Subramanian (2006)). An alternative view is that India is effectively a lagged version of 
China, and the two have to be considered a joint global presence. India and China are thus 
viewed in the literature in different comparative mode. That their bilateral closeness is 
deepening is evident in a number of areas. On the trade front, India-China bilateral trade has 
increased by a factor of 33 between 1995 and 2007, and this growth has occurred at an 
accelerating rate. This compares with a 7 fold increase in the China’s overall trade this period. 
With bilateral FDI the increase is even more dramatic, around 90 fold over the same period, 
but admittedly from a small base. And while strategic issues remain between India and China 
since they are complicated by the relationships of each other with Pakistan, on bilateral 
economic policy coordination there has also been considerable joint movement towards joint 
positions. There has been a feasibility study for a possible India-China FTA. They have also 
jointly agreed a bilateral pact on climate policy underpinning their joint negotiating stance in 
Copenhagen in 2009 on a post Kyoto global climate regime; and in international forums such 
as the WTO (and specifically in the Doha Round) both countries have supported each others’ 
positions, and especially so in key meetings such as in July 2008 in Geneva. 
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1.  Introduction 
China and India together comprise around 40% of the world population and are widely 
seen as a large pool of low wage labour restrained in international mobility by OECD 
immigration restrictions. The effective entry of India and China into the global economy from 
the early 1990’s generated opportunities for extensive global arbitrage in goods trade embodying 
low wage labour, FDI inflows to access low wage labour, outsourcing from the OECD, and 
transfer from the OECD of labour intensive service functions in call centers and other activities. 
The result has been a pronounced growth surge in these economies; in the last decade (or more) 
in the Indian case and over the last two decades in the Chinese case. Despite the Financial Crisis, 
GDP growth in the last quarter of 2009 was 8.8 % in India and in the first quarter of 2010 was 
11.9% in China. A widely held view is that this elevated growth performance could persist for 
several more decades, and if so, India and China will jointly provide growing and eventually 
major influence over the global economy. 
In this paper we focus on one element of these developments; the rapidly deepening 
bilateral India-China economic relationship. India and China are viewed in the literature in 
different comparative modes. Each is deeply integrating into the global economy through trade 
and FDI inflows. China is seen by some as primarily manufacturing-lead growth with India as 
service-lead growth (see Rodrick & Subramanian (2006)). An alternative view is that India is 
effectively a lagged version of China, and the two have to be considered a joint global presence.  
  That their bilateral closeness is deepening is evident in a number of areas. On the trade 
front, India-China bilateral trade has increased by a factor of 33 between 1995 and 2007, and this 
growth has occurred at an accelerating rate. This compares with a 7 fold increase in China’s 
overall trade this period. With bilateral FDI the increase is even more dramatic, around 90 fold 3 
 
over the same period, but admittedly from a small base. And while strategic issues remain 
between India and China such as the relationship of each with Pakistan, on bilateral economic 
policy coordination there has also been considerable joint movement towards joint positions. 
There has been a feasibility study for a possible India-China FTA. They have also jointly agreed 
a bilateral pact on climate policy underpinning their joint negotiating stance in Copenhagen in 
2009 on a post Kyoto global climate regime; and in international forums such as the WTO (and 
specifically in the Doha Round) both countries have supported each others’ positions, and 
especially so in key meetings such as in July 2008 in Geneva.  
In what follows, we document not only the clear deepening of the China-India economic 
relationship, but also emphasize the growing acceleration of this trend in the most recent years. 
We present data on bilateral trade and FDI flows and highlight its product and sector 
composition, as well as its regional intensity for each of the two economies. We also present 
recent data showing how these trends have been affected by the financial crisis. We then use the 
data as a basis to make forward projections, which points surprisingly quickly to an emerging 
globally significant profile for the India-China relationship. We finally document the growing 
policy coordination occurring bilaterally, and discuss its future potential evolution. 
2.  Economic Performance in China and India 
Both India and China have achieved high growth rates by historical standards in recent 
years. India has been growing in the last five years before the crisis at rates which match those of 
Japan in the 1960’s and Korea in the late 1970’s. This growth has progressively accelerated since 
major reforms were initiated in 1989-1991.  China has been growing at even higher and 
unprecedented rates which pre-crisis touched 13% per year.  4 
 
The pace of the change which these growth rates imply is breathtaking.  China’s 11
th Five 
Year Plan in 2005 set a minimum target for China’s long-term growth of 7.5% per year, a target 
which has already been easily exceeded. Growth at 7.5 % a year over 50 years yields a 30-fold 
increase in real GDP per capita. But not only is the issue the global impact from separate high 
growth by India and China, but also the input of their even more rapid growth and acceleration in 
growth of joint interdependence and hence their emergence as a progressively cohesive 
economic bloc in the decades ahead.  
The main features of their growth performance are set out in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Table 
2.1 reports GDP/Capita in constant 2000 US dollars. Between 1998 and 2009 China experienced 
an 8 fold increase in GDP/capita. In the late 70’s and early 80’s India had GDP/Capita above that 
of China, but now lags by almost 3:1. In purchasing power parity terms, World Bank data 
suggest that as late as 1992 India had GDP/capita above China, but in 2008 the gap was also 
nearly 3:1 in favour of China. The gap between India and China has thus widened substantially 
in the last 15 years due to more rapid growth in China. Table 2.2 reports annual growth rates 
since 1994. 
Behind these two aggregate growth profiles there are both similarities and differences. 
The similarity is the common integration in to the global economy in each case. As Table 2.3 
indicates, the share of trade (combined exports and imports) relative to GDP has increased 
sharply for each country. In the Indian case this is from 16 % of GDP to 46% of GDP in 2007. In 
China’s case, it is from 35% in 1990 to 70% in 2007. Equally, there are large increases in FDI 
inflows. The increase in the Chinese case from 1990 to 2007 is from around $ 2 billion/year to 
$70 billion. The increase in India occurs considerably later, but still increases from $ 2 
billion/year in 2003 to $ 20 billion in 2008. Growth in bilateral trade and FDI flows between  5 
 
 
Table 2.1:  GDP per Capita for India and China, 1994-2008 (2000 US $) 
Year  India China 
1994  351.87 599.80 
1995  371.81 658.00 
1996  392.92 716.25 
1997  401.79 774.89 
1998  419.40 827.35 
1999  442.79 882.56 
2000  452.97 949.18 
2001  468.96 1,020.52 
2002  479.12 1,105.96 
2003  511.54 1,209.00 
2004  546.03 1,323.23 
2005  588.99 1,452.28 
2006  637.08 1,611.71 
2007  685.55 1,811.75 
2008  717.51 1,964.71 









Table 2.2: GDP Growth Rates for India and China, 1994-2008 (Annual %) 
Year India  China 
1994  6.65 13.10 
1995  7.57 10.90 
1996  7.56 10.00 
1997  4.05 9.30 
1998  6.19 7.80 
1999  7.39 7.60 
2000  4.03 8.40 
2001  5.22 8.30 
2002  3.77 9.10 
2003  8.37 10.00 
2004  8.28 10.10 
2005  9.35 10.40 
2006  9.67 11.60 
2007  9.06 13.00 
2008  6.07 9.00 








Table 2.3: Trade (Imports plus Exports) as % of GDP, for India and China, 1994-2008  
Year India  China 
1994  20.31 47.31 
1995  23.13 43.94 
1996  22.19 38.06 
1997  22.89 39.01 
1998  23.98 36.39 
1999  25.28 37.97 
2000  27.38 44.24 
2001  26.41 43.08 
2002  29.97 47.70 
2003  30.90 56.91 
2004  37.94 65.35 
2005  42.53 69.28 
2006  47.44 72.03 
2007  45.88 70.28 
2008  50.70 65.05 








India and China must therefore be seen relative to the growth occurring in their total trade 
and FDI flows. 
 
But there are also differences. In the Indian case, one is a sharper rise in service related 
exports and the role of services more generally in the growth process and especially so for 
information technology related services. This growth has also been accompanied by substantial 
outsourcing of labour intensive services to India, and is in part reflective of India’s language 
situation, especially in such areas as call centres. Bilateral service flow data between India and 
China are not available, but service exports as a percentage of total exports of goods and services 
grow from 20.2% in 1990 for India to 35.4% in 2008 while in China they fall from 10.2% in 
1990 to 9.3% in 2008.
2 Another difference has been the later growth of exports in the Indian 
case. Also a sharp increase in the inequality has occurred in the Chinese case with regional 
concentration of growth in coastal zones, this has not occurred in the Indian case. 
Table 2.4 reports data on the industry composition of growth. India’s growth post trade 
liberalization in 1991 has been accompanied by a small percent increase in services while 
manufacturing has more heavily led China’s growth. In both cases the share of agriculture 
declines, and especially so in China.    
Between 1950 and 1990, agriculture’s share in India in GDP declined by 25 % while the 
share of industry and services both increased. Industry’s share is roughly constant after 1990 and 
the subsequent decline in agriculture is accompanied by a similar increase for the service sector. 
But, despite a decline in the share of agriculture in GDP, there has not been a decline in the share 





Table 2.4: Comparison of Sector Wide Composition of GDP in India and China, 1990-2008                          
Year  Agriculture (% of  Industry(% of GDP)  Services(% of GDP) 
 India China  India China  India  China 
1990  29 27 27 41  44  32 
1991  30 24 25 42  45  34 
1992  29 22 26 43  45  35 
1993  29 20 26 46  45  34 
1994  28 20 27 46  45  34 
1995  26 20 28 47  46  33 
1996  27 20 27 48  46  32 
1997  26 18 27 48  47  34 
1998  26 18 26 46  48  36 
1999  25 16 25 46  50  38 
2000  24 15 26 46  50  39 
2001  23 14 26 46  51  40 
2002  21 14 26 45  53  41 
2003  21 13 26 46  53  41 
2004  19 13 28 47  53  40 
2005  19 12 29 48  52  40 
2006  18 11 29 49  53  40 
2007  18 11 30 49  52  40 
2008  17 11 29 49  54  40 




increase in the share in employment. In China, in contrast, the share of employment in the 
service sector has increased steadily since 1978 and China’s service sector now employs 
relatively more labour than in India. In India the decline in service employment has been 
accompanied by an increase in labour productivity. This has been due to the growth of services 
in sub-sectors which employ more skilled labour. 
India has also experienced fast growth in outsourcing, achieving an average annual 
growth of 37% between 2004-2008. Despite the financial crisis of 2008, services outsourcing in 
China grew at 54% year on year to $1.6 billion. However, China still significantly lags India. 
The same year, India accounted for nearly 37% of global outsourcing, while China was less than 
10%. A future problem for Indian outsourcing activity could be wage levels. The ratio of wages 
in the related services sector in India and the USA was 1:6 but it is nearly 1:3 in early 2009 while 
the ratio of similar service sector wages in China and the USA is about 1:7. This difference 
partly reflects the more detailed composition of the two service sectors but cost factors might 
prompt a shift of outsourcing from India to China in the future. However, outsourcing clients 
also focus on service capabilities, including intellectual property protection and language skills. 
China has weaker intellectual property protection and has fewer skilled IT workers in areas such 
as business process, management and interpersonal communication
34. 
Table 2.5 highlights some of the differences China and India’s growth experience over 
the last 20 years. The patterns have mostly been similar, the difference arising primarily in the 





mostly a lagged version of China. Inequality, however, has worsened in China (but with large 
improvements in absolute poverty) while remaining roughly constant in India.    
Table 2.5: Similarities and Differences in China and India’s Growth Experiences 
Similarities: Growth in Trade and FDI Inflows 
 1990  2007 
Trade (Imports+Exports) as % of GDP    
India 16  46 
China 35  70 
FDI inflows as % of GDP    
India ~  2 
China 1  4 
 
Differences: Information technology services and Inequality of Household Income 
 
Information Technology Services as % 
of Service Exports 
2000 2007 
India 32  46 
China 6  5 
Inequality of Household Income    
GINI Index India    0.36 
GINI Index China    0.47 













3.  The Deepening Trade and FDI Relationship 
India and China are the two most rapidly growing countries in the G20 and also two of 
the twelve G20 countries with GDP above 1 trillion dollars. While growth accelerated in the 
1980’s, trade liberalization following 1991 has been an important factor behind India’s post-
colonial resurgence level. India’s exports have grown steadily since the early 90’s barring the 
two years-1998 and 2009, the years coinciding with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis and 
the more recent Financial Crisis.  
The trade and other reforms which led to the opening of the Chinese economy in the 90’s 
have also led to a large increase in exports. These have been accompanied by a reduction in the 
share exports of primary goods from 50% in 1980 to 5% in 2008 while the share of 
manufacturing goods in exports has risen to almost 95% (China Statistical Year Book, 2009).  
Table 3:1 sets out the bilateral trade data. China has become India’s largest trade partner, 
overtaking the US and UAE in the last two years. After border-trade resumed in July ’92, India’s 
exports to China rose sharply, as a fraction of India’s total exports they increased from 1.3 % in 
1994, to 10.15% in 2004-05. They then fell by a couple of percentage points for two years, and 
then rose again to a high of 11.3% in 2008.  India is not as significant a trade partner for China as 
China is for India, but exports to India still account for 2 % of China’s total exports world-wide. 
Bilateral trade between India and China was in excess of $50 bn in 2008, only to fall to $43 bn 
during the Financial Crisis in 2009. But what is remarkable is not the only growth of trade but 
the rate at which it has been growing. Since 2000, India’s exports to China grew 7-fold until 
2005 and more than 15-fold in the 8 year period 2001-2008. Correspondingly China’s exports to 
India grew 5 times from 2001-2005 and by more than 20 times from 2001-2008. In 2005, at a  13 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Bilateral Exports as a share of India and China’s Total Exports, 
1994-2009 
Year India's  Exports 
to China 
($billion) 
 Indian Exports 
to China (% of 
Total Exports)   
China's Exports 
to India ($ 
billion) 
 Chinese Exports 
to India(% of 
Total Exports) 
1994  0.32  1.28 0.57 0.473 
1995 0.4  1.3  0.77  0.514 
1996  .72  2.17 0.69 0.455 
1997  0.9  2.56 0.93 0.511 
1998  0.91  2.71 1.02 0.553 
1999  0.83  2.31 1.16 0.596 
2000  1.35  3.17 1.56 0.626 
2001 1.7  3.92  1.9  0.712 
2002  2.28  4.62 2.67 0.82 
2003  4.25  7.39 3.34 0.763 
2004 7.68  10.16  5.94  1 
2005 9.77  10.15  8.93  1.172 
2006 10.28  8.49  14.58  1.505 
2007 14.62  9.94  24.01  1.972 
2008 20.26  11.3  31.58  2.208 
2009 13.71  8.4  29.67  2.468 






heads of States meeting both countries set a target of $30 bn for bilateral trade by 2010. Bilateral 
trade in 2004 was $ 14 bn and the target of $30 bn was achieved in 2007. The bilateral country 
trade could now exceed $60 bn by the end of 2010.  
            India had a small trade deficit with China until 2002. 2003-2005 were better years for the 
Indian trade imbalance; however, after 2006 the trend reversed significantly with India recording 
heavy trade deficits.  
Table 3.2 reports the growth of India’s exports to China and conversely Chinese exports 
to India. These grew rapidly after reform since the base of trade was low, but an acceleration in 
this growth has also occurred, barring 2009 after the financial crisis. India’s exports to China 
were affected by the Asian Financial Crisis and the recent Global Financial Crisis, but excluding 
2006, bilateral exports have grown by at least 23 % each year and in three years (1996, 2003 and 
2004) touched 80% growth.  
Comparing bilateral export growth data with respective country’s overall export growth 
shows the changes in trade vis-à-vis each other. India has had a significantly larger surge in its 
exports to China than in its total exports throughout this period except for the two years of the 
Asian Financial Crisis and 2006. China bilateral trade growth is also more constant when 
contrasted with India. Only in 1996 did exports to India grow by a smaller amount than total 
exports. 1996 has been the only year when they recorded negative growth in their exports to 
India over the last 15 years. Also, the Asian Financial Crisis did not affect China’s exports to 
India much as export growth stayed near the 15% mark. Between 2004 and 2007 China’s exports 
to India grew by more than 50% a year.  
 15 
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of growth of bilateral exports relative to growth of India and 
China’s total exports, 1995-2009 
All figures in % 
Year  Growth of India's 
Exports to  China 
Growth of India's 
Total Exports 
Growth of China's 
Exports to India 
Growth of China's 
Total Exports 
1995 23.55  22.42  33.55  22.95 
1996 80.91  8.09  -10.16  1.54 
1997 24.76  5.7  35.8  21 
1998 0.94  -4.39  8.87  0.53 
1999 -8.82  6.69  14.29  6.08 
2000 63.9  19.62  34.32  27.84 
2001 25.6  1.64  21.5  6.8 
2002 33.76  13.49  40.86  22.33 
2003 86.97  16.72  25.16  34.59 
2004 80.6  31.42  77.55  35.39 
2005 27.12  27.35  50.51  28.42 
2006 5.23  25.75  63.21  27.16 
2007 42.22  21.51  64.67  25.68 
2008 38.6  21.96  31.54  17.48 
2009 -32.33  -9.03  -6.06  -15.98 







Table 3.3 presents month-by-month data on India-China bilateral trade during the recent 
Financial Crisis. India’s exports to China fell sharply in late 2008 in October and were down by 
nearly 38% over the next 10 months. The Indian economy started showing signs of recovery 
from September 2009. For China the effects are delayed and less pronounced compared to India. 
China’s exports to India fell sharply in November 2008 but dropped by only 7 % over the next 
ten months. The India’s bilateral exports to China have thus been more volatile compared to 
India’s exports, while for China the opposite is true.  
In Table 3.4 we present some simple projections of bilateral India-China trade which 
illustrate its potential future growth. Simple compounding of growth at pre-crisis growth rates 
suggests a rapidly deepening global joint presence. At current rates of growth by 2015 India will 
export goods and services worth more than a $100 billion to China and its trade (exports) with 
China will account for more than 20% of its total exports. China will touch the $100 billion mark 
in 2012 only and by 2015 it would export almost $ 600 billion of exports to India.  
Data on FDI flows is more fragmentary but Table 3:5 indicates that bilateral FDI between 
China and India remains small although they are growing even more rapidly than trade. From 
1997 to 2008 India’s investment into China has increased by a factor of 250 although the base in 
1999 was less than half a million USD. Similarly, Chinese investment in India has increased by a 
factor of more than 100 in the past 10 years, again from a small base.  
Wei (2005) highlights China’s large domestic market as a major determinant of its 
inward FDI from OECD countries. For India both the domestic market and cheap labor cost are 
also important. China’s better performance in attracting FDI from OECD countries also reflects 17 
 
its trade ties to the OECD. India has advantages of lower labor costs, geographic closeness to 
OECD, and more cultural similarity and has begun to close the gap more recently.  
Table 3.3: Monthly Bilateral Trade data for India and China During the Recent Financial 
Crisis, January 2007-2010 
Growth measured with respect to the same month previous year. All figures are in %  





Growth of China's 




2007 Jan-Dec  42.22  21.51  64.67  25.68 
2008 Jan-Dec  38.6  21.96  31.54  17.48 
2008 Aug  31.33  27.91  30.19  21.11 
 Sep 25.56  14.78  24.07  21.41 
 Oct -12.66  -11.86  14.03  19.12 
 Nov  -51.82  -19.26  -5.75  -2.24 
 Dec -49.33  -1.01  -1.49  -2.85 
2009 Jan  -59.92  -12.51  -17.65  -17.5 
 Feb -43.95  -20.98  -11.92  -25.72 
 Mar -39.1  -25.16  -8.08  -17.14 
 Apr -51.87  -22.88  -13.6  -22.55 
 May  -57.93  -23.15  -20.02  -26.34 
 Jun -49.15  -20.53  -25.42  -21.18 
 Jul  -39.34  -17.9  -3.85  -22.87 
 Aug  -43.04  -16.18  -9.09  -23.1 
 Sep 11.34  1.54  -8.14  -15.02 
 Oct -0.88  13.91  -4.15  -13.69 
 Nov  76.27  41.22  25.61  -1.16 
 Dec 71.2  26.71  38.84  17.6 
2010 Jan  111.41  19.04  36.72  21.12 
Source: Chinese data- http://www.customs-info.com/; Indian data- http://www.indiastat.com/ 18 
 
Table 3.4: Forward Projections of India-China Bilateral Trade
5 




to China (% of 





to India (% of 
Total Exports)  
2009 13.71  8.4  29.67  2.468 
2010 19.4682  9.85  48.9555  3.23 
2011 27.644844  11.56  80.776575  4.23 
2012 39.25567848  13.57  133.2813488  5.54 
2013 55.74306344  15.93  219.9142254  7.25 
2014 79.15515009  18.69  362.858472  9.50 
2015 112.4003131  21.94  598.7164788  12.44 
2016 159.6084446  25.75  987.8821899  16.29 
2017 226.6439914  30.22  1630.005613  21.34 
2018 321.8344678  35.46  2689.509262  27.94 
2019 457.0049442  41.62  4437.690282  36.59 
2020 648.9470208  48.84  7322.188966  47.92 










Table 3.5: Bilateral FDI inflows between India and China and total inflows by country, 
1997-2009  
All figures in $million 
 China  India 
Year Inwards:India  Inwards:Total Inwards:  China  Inwards:Total 
1997  0.4   45257.0      
1998  5.6   45462.8      
1999   0.5   40318.7      
2000  10.4   40714.8   a  2315 
2001  12.0   46877.6   b  3402 
2002   30.6   52742.9   c  3234 
2003   15.9   53504.7   d  2057 
2004   19.5   60630.0   e  3258 
2005   21.4   60324.6   f  4356 
2006   52.4   63020.5   g  14212 
2007   34.0   74767.9   0.7   15921 
2008   88.1   92395.4   7.8   33027 
2009   -   -  44.271  - 
a+b+c+d+e+f+g=2.41 







4.  The Deepening International Policy Coordination between India and China 
China and India, while building ever deeper trade and FDI links have nonetheless 
remained distant in geopolitical and security terms. Policies towards Pakistan, nuclear issues, and 
memories of Chinese adventures in Assam in the 1960’s along with the Chinese break with the 
Soviets at that time remain. But this has not prevented India and China from advancing on 
several fronts on international economic policy coordination. These developments thus also are 
part of their growing economic bilateral engagement.   
Climate Policy 
In climate policy, China and India signed a five year agreement in October 2009 to 
jointly fight climate change and to negotiate international climate deals using common positions. 
Both countries set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) which holds meetings annually in India and 
China and discusses their respective domestic policies, and also implementation of related 
cooperative projects. The agreement calls for cooperation on renewable energy and research into 
the effects of climate change on Himalayan glaciers amongst discussions on domestic initiatives 
and common political in multilateral negotiations. 
This agreement was signed ahead of the United Nations climate-change summit that was 
held in December 2009 in Copenhagen. It highlights the joint gains from coalitional activities 
both on climate and other issues. China and India are both members of G20, and have 
consistently argued that developing countries should not be required to set and meet the same 
targets for reducing greenhouse gases as developed countries, who have a greater historical 
responsibility for the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases. 21 
 
Pre-Copenhagen, a joint negotiating position was developed by India, China, Brazil and 
South Africa (the so called BASIC countries). A proposal made at the Copenhagen Summit 
requiring developing countries, including India and China, to not exceed their Greenhouse gas 
emissions after 2025, was unacceptable to both India and China. The BASIC countries prepared 
their counter-draft well in advance of the Summit, and India and China’s cohesion on climate 
change remained throughout the Copenhagen Summit. They rejected calls by developed nations 
to set legally binding targets, and India and China then signed a modified Copenhagen Accord in 
March 2010. 
India- China FTA 
India and China have also been discussing a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) since 
2004 as well as a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). A Joint Study 
Group (JSG) was appointed to discuss possible measures for comprehensive trade and economic 
cooperation. The study group builds on a mandate contained in the first India-China Joint 
Declaration signed on June 2003.  
The JSG has reported that there had been a high commodity concentration in bilateral 
trade before 2003. The top ten export products contributed more than 80% of trade in both 
directions. It recommended an India-China Regional Trading Agreement, covering trade in 
goods and services and investment, and identified common ground for trade and investment 
promotion and facilitation. An important element in the Study was the recommendation that 
economic cooperation should look beyond simply promoting trade and investment, to 
information exchange between government agencies, exchanges of development experience and 
technology, and industrial cooperation in agriculture and rural development, the electronics 22 
 
sector and elsewhere. Since both countries rely heavily on imports of oil and gas and mutual 
cooperation in energy security was emphasized as of strategic importance.  
Following the Joint Study Group, China was reported to be pushing for an FTA in March  
2005 with India, which would result in the formation of the biggest free trade area in the World . 
But in April 2008 India, though wanting closer ties with its neighbor, was firm on a stand of not 
yet entering a China FTA. A number of reasons were put forward. First, India continued to have 
substantially higher tariffs than China, so there were potential losses seen from a transfer of tariff 
revenue to Chinese firms in the form of higher profits. Second, Indian industries opposed the 
FTA on the grounds a potential surge of cheap imports would result in losses for Indian 
producers. Third, the Indian Government would have to confer Market Economy status on 
China, which it did not want to do as it did not deem China’s pricing arrangements as 
transparent.  
Dumping has also rapidly grown into a politically sensitive issue that cannot be 
discounted in FTA negotiations. Between 1995 and 2008, China has had a record 677 anti-
dumping initiations against her, 120 of which were from India. Bilaterally, this is the largest 
number of cases reported against any exporting country. Next on the list is 84, which is the 
number of cases initiated by the entire European Community against China. Conversely, India 
has been the target of only 4 initiations against them by China
6.   
Beyond the China-India bilateral FTA both an India-ASEAN FTA and a China-ASEAN 
FTA have been concluded and came into effect in January 2010. In terms of population these are 





traded behind the EU and NAFTA. It can thus be argued that India and China are now involved 
in an indirect FTA. However according to recent news reports India is already concerned about 
the rising trade deficit with China due to the China-ASEAN FTA, since China has lowered its 
tariffs on the goods it imports from ASEAN, creating trade divergence and making it more 
difficult for India to export to China. The consequent decline in India’s exports to China could 
thus further increase the trade deficit that India runs with China.  
India and China at WTO 
Both India and China also show more evidence of coordinating positions in international 
negotiating forums and especially the WTO. India was a catalyst in the cessation of Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) trade talks at Geneva in July 2008. The broad objective of the 
DDA was to lower trade barriers across the world so as to allow countries to increase trade 
globally. For seven years, the talks meandered with frequent disagreements between the 
developed countries led by the USA and EU, and the developing countries led by the G4 of 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa. After years of negotiations, all seemed set for a successful 
conclusion in 2008. But the talks broke down after refusal of the USA to negotiate a ‘special 
safeguard arrangement’ in agriculture as India had requested. China supported India’s stand. The 
two countries’ mutual support drew widespread criticism from not only developed countries but 





5.  Conclusion 
  In the decades ahead if they continue their present growth India and China will each 
become an even more major presence in the global economy. This has been widely recognized, 
but what has been less well documented is the even more rapid growth of trade and investment 
between the two. We emphasize a 33 fold increase in bilateral trade between 1995 and 2007, 
accompanied by a 100-fold increase in bilateral FDI. Along with this has come with increased 
international policy coordination between China and India. The world of the early 21
st  century is 
thus not only one of rapid growth of low wage large population economies; it is also an even 
more rapid growth of their bilateral interactions, and hence their emergence as an  even more 
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